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Comment
Truth in Lending: The Right to Rescind
and the Statute of Limitations
I. Introduction
By enacting section 1251 of the Truth in Lending Act,2 Con-
gress sought to protect consumers in transactions creating a se-
curity interest in a consumer's principal dwelling.3 Under this
section, a cooling-off period of three business days is provided in
which a consumer may rescind or cancel the transaction, pre-
sumably after more deliberate consideration.4 If statutory re-
quirements are not met, however, the right to rescind extends
for three years after consummation of the transaction. 5 A prob-
lem of statutory interpretation has arisen regarding the effect of
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a)-(g) (1988).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665b (1988).
3. N.C. Freed Co. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 473
F.2d 1210, 1214 (2d Cir. 1973).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (1988). The statute provides:
Except as otherwise provided... in the case of any consumer credit transac-
tion.., in which a security interest... is or will be retained or acquired in
any property which is used as the principal dwelling of the person to whom
credit is extended, the obligor shall have the right to rescind the transaction
until midnight of the third business day following the consummation of the
transaction or the delivery of the information and rescission forms required
under this section together with a statement containing the material disclo-
sures required under this subchapter, whichever is later ....
Id.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (1988). The section provides:
An obligor's right of rescission shall expire three years after the date of con-
summation of the transaction, or upon sale of the property, whichever oc-
curs first, notwithstanding the fact that the information and forms required
under this section or any other disclosures required under this part have not
been delivered to the obligor ....
Id.
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the three-year limitation period on the right to rescind when
the consumer asserts the right as a defense to a creditor's cause
of action, rather than as a claim for affirmative relief.6
Although only two cases have been decided on the issue, the
courts that have considered the question have held that the con-
sumer's right to rescind may be asserted as a defense by recoup-
ment7 after the statutory limitation period has ended."
This Comment begins its analysis by setting forth the his-
tory and purpose of the Truth in Lending Act in Part II and
delineating the statutory right of rescission. Part III proceeds
to analyze common law recoupment and its relationship to stat-
utes of limitation. The precedential value of litigation concern-
ing civil liability brought under section 130 of the Truth in
Lending Act,9 upon which courts deciding the rescission issue
have relied, is discussed in Part IV. Part V then examines the
primary cases that have directly considered the defensive claim
of rescission beyond the limitation period, both of which held
that the claim remains effective to defeat or reduce creditors'
affirmative actions. These courts interpreted the provisions of
the Truth in Lending Act broadly to achieve its purpose of con-
sumer protection. The Comment then analyzes the economic ef-
fect of affording a rescission remedy after the three-year
limitation period has expired, finding that the penalty increases
over time. In light of this increasing penalty, analogy to section
130 penalties, which are capped at $1,000, is deemed inappro-
priate. The policy rationale underlying recoupment doctrine,
the Comment concludes, is not called into play absent detrimen-
tal reliance by a consumer or other inequitable conduct by the
creditor. Therefore, rescission should not be allowed on a the-
ory of recoupment without clear congressional intent in the Act.
6. Id.
7. Recoupment is defined as "a right of the defendant to have a deduction from
the amount of the plaintiff's damages, for the reason that the plaintiff has not
complied with the cross-obligations or independent covenants arising under the
same contract." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1275 (6th ed. 1990).
8. Dawe v. Merchants Mortgage & Trust, 683 P.2d 796 (Colo. 1984); FDIC v.
Ablin, 532 N.E.2d 379 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)-(h) (1988).
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II. The Truth in Lending Act and the Right to Rescind
A. The Truth in Lending Act
Enacted in 1968, the Truth in Lending Act was the first fed-
eral consumer protection law and is considered a leading con-
sumer protection statute.'0 The Act regulates primarily by
mandating standard terminology and uniform disclosure re-
quirements;1 it is an information protection device aimed at al-
lowing informed credit shopping.12 In this way, not only does
the individual consumer benefit by the ability to make an in-
formed choice, but the market efficiency so achieved provides
benefits to consumers and society generally. 13
The Act provides, however, for certain behavioral or market
protection goals. 14 These provisions "involve direct governmen-
tal interventions to affect market behavior of participants (espe-
cially businesses) . . . ."15 Among these is the requirement of a
cooling-off period for credit secured by the consumer's home-
the right to rescind.'6
The right to rescind arises when a consumer enters into a
non-purchase-money transaction that grants a security interest
in the consumer's principal dwelling.'7 If the creditor complies
10. S. REP. No. 73, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 280, 280 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]. The Truth in Lending Act
§ 102 provides:
The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be enhanced and the
competition among the various financial institutions.., would be strength-
ened by the informed use of credit. The informed use of credit results from
an awareness of the cost thereof by consumers. It is the purpose of this
subchapter to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the con-
sumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms avail-
able to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the
consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card
practices.
15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1990).
11. Joseph A. Dworetzky, Comment, Truth in Lending and the Statute of Lim-
itations, 21 VILL. L. REV. 904, 909-10 (1975-76). See also FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD,
REGULATORY ANALYSIS OF REVISED REGULATION Z, 46 Fed. Reg. 20,941 (1981)
[hereinafter ANALYSIS].
12. SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 280.
13. Id.
14. ANALYSIS, supra note 11, at 20,946.
15. Id. at 20,944.
16. Id. at 20,946.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (1988).
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with the requirements of the Act, then the consumer's right to
rescind expires three business days after the last of three
events: the date of the transaction, the furnishing of material
disclosures, or the furnishing of two properly completed copies
of a notice of right to cancel.18 If the creditor fails to comply,
then the consumer's right to rescind continues for three years or
until sale of the property, whichever occurs earlier.19
The Truth in Lending Act and the implementing regula-
tions 20 provide specific procedures the creditor must follow if the
consumer rescinds. 21 The exercise of the right itself cancels the
security interest, and the creditor must take the necessary
steps to so indicate. 22 The creditor must also return all
amounts paid by the consumer in connection with the transac-
tion, even if paid to third parties.23 Only then must the con-
sumer return the money or property given by the creditor in
connection with the transaction.24 Courts are specifically au-
thorized to modify the procedure in equity.25 Thus, in a normal
loan transaction, it is likely a creditor will be allowed to net any
amount it owes the consumer from the amount the consumer
must return to the creditor. This is particularly so if the rescis-
18. Id.
19. Id. § 1635(f).
20. Regulation Z of the Federal Reserve Board, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.30 (1993).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1988). The statute provides:
Within 20 days after receipt of a notice of rescission, the creditor shall re-
turn to the obligor any money or property given as earnest money, down
payment, or otherwise, and shall take any action necessary or appropriate
to reflect the termination of any security interest created under the transac-
tion. If the creditor has delivered any property to the obligor, the obligor
may retain possession of it. Upon the performance of the creditor's obliga-
tions under this section, the obligor shall tender the property to the creditor
.... The procedures prescribed by this subsection shall apply except when
otherwise ordered by a court.
Id.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1988). Regulations further provide that "[wihen a
consumer rescinds a transaction, the security interest giving rise to the right of
rescission becomes void and the consumer shall not be liable for any amount, in-
cluding any finance charge." 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)(1) (1993).
23. 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)(2) (1993).
24. Id. § 226.23(d)(3).
25. Id. § 226.23(d)(4).
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sion is raised solely in defense to the creditor's claim as a reduc-
tion of the amount due the creditor on the note.26
In some cases, the consumer first attempts to exercise the
right to rescind when the creditor brings an action in foreclo-
sure after the consumer's default. If this occurs more than
three years after the date of the transaction that gave rise to
the right to rescind, the creditor did not meet the statutory dis-
closure or notice requirements, and the consumer raises the
right in defense of the foreclosure action, the issue at hand
arises.
B. The Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act
The original Truth in Lending Act was considered effective
in fostering increasing consumer awareness of credit costs and,
indirectly, greater market efficiencies.27 Despite its success, ex-
perience during the first decade under its provisions indicated
improvements were called for.28
The Act is complex and technical. Even more complex is
Regulation Z, promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board to ef-
fectuate the Act. "By early 1980 the Act filled 20 printed pages
in 52 numbered sections, many with lengthy subdivisions. The
regulation measured 53 printed pages in 153 highly technical
sections ... ."29 Between 1968 and 1980 the Federal Reserve
Board had issued more than 1500 interpretations and more
than 1300 lawsuits had been filed in federal courts, "represent-
ing 2 per cent of the [flederal civil caseload."30 Compliance with
the Act was difficult. "Federal bank regulatory agencies re-
ported that more than 80 per cent of banks were not wholly in
compliance, although most violations were judged 'nonsubstan-
tive' or 'technical'."31
26. The Simplification Act specifically authorizes courts to adjust the rescis-
sion procedure to apply equitable principles. See infra note 44 and accompanying
text. See also infra text accompanying note 214 for an example of the effect of
rescission on a hypothetical transaction.
27. SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 280.
28. Id. at 281.
29. ANALYSIS, supra note 11, at 20,941-42.
30. Id. at 20,942.
31. Id. (citing BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., ANNUAL RE-
PORT TO CONGRESS ON TRuTH n' LENDING FOR THE YEAR 1978, at 10-11 (1979)).
1994] 637
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In response, Congress passed the Truth in Lending Simpli-
fication and Reform Act.32 The Simplification Act focused on
four major areas: providing simpler, more understandable infor-
mation to the consumer, making creditor compliance easier,
limiting civil liability for creditors to significant violations only,
and strengthening provisions for administrative enforcement. 33
Creditor's civil liability for statutory penalties was limited
to disclosure violations of central importance only.34 In closed-
end transactions,3 5 the Simplification Act provided that liability
attached only to violations regarding "disclosure of the amount
financed, the finance charge, the total of payments, the annual
percentage rate, the number, amount and due dates of pay-
ments, any security interest taken, and, where applicable, the
consumer's right of rescission."36 In open-end transactions, lia-
bility continued to attach to most of the specific disclosure re-
quirements.37 Under this provision, a consumer may recover
twice the amount of the finance charge, but not less than $100
nor more than $1000.38 These penalties are available without
any showing of damage by the consumer, who may also recover
actual damages sustained.39
In considering the Simplification Act, Congress gave spe-
cific attention to the defensive use of section 130 truth in lend-
ing claims. The Simplification Act explicitly provided that a
32. Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94
Stat. 168 (1980) [hereinafter Simplification Act].
33. SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 281.
34. Id.
35. For purposes of the Truth in Lending Act, closed-end credit is defined as
consumer credit other than open-end credit. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(10) (1993). The
regulation defines open-end credit as follows:
"Open-end credit" means consumer credit extended by a creditor under a
plan in which:
(i) The creditor reasonably contemplates repeated transactions;
(ii) The creditor may impose a finance charge from time to time on an out-
standing unpaid balance; and
(iii) The amount of credit that may be extended to the consumer during the
term of the plan.., is generally made available to the extent that any out-
standing balance is repaid.
12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(20) (1993).
36. SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 285.
37. Id. See supra note 35 for a definition of open-end credit.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i) (1988) [hereinafter § 130 penalties].
39. Id. § 1640(a)(1).
638 [Vol. 14:633
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consumer may assert a defensive truth in lending claim in re-
coupment or offset beyond the one-year limitation period appli-
cable to these claims, unless otherwise prohibited by state
law. 40 In so doing, Congress settled an issue that had divided
the courts that had considered the question.41
Congress amended provisions dealing with the right of re-
scission as well. Material disclosures were limited by definition
to the ones of central importance.42 Thus, misdisclosure of
other, non-material terms did not prevent the three day cooling-
off period from running.43 When a consumer exercised the right
to rescind, the Simplification Act provided that courts were au-
thorized to impose equitable conditions on the precise proce-
dural requirements mandated by the Act to afford adequate
protection to the creditor." Furthermore, the time for creditors
to respond was lengthened to twenty days.45
Congress further provided amendments expanding the
right to rescind. Key among these was:
an important provision designed to preserve the consumer's right
of rescission where an enforcement agency is investigating
whether a creditor has failed to inform the consumer of his
right.... This will assure that the maximum 3 year period for
rescinding.., does not expire before a consumer's rights are adju-
dicated by an enforcing agency.46
40. Simplification Act § 615(d)(4) (amending Truth in Lending Act § 130, codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1988)).
41. See infra part IV.
42. Section 612(a)(2) of the Simplification Act defines material disclosure as
disclosure of:
the annual percentage rate, the method of determining the finance charge
and the balance upon which a finance charge will be imposed, the amount of
the finance charge, the amount to be financed, the total of payments, the
number and amount of payments, and the due dates or periods of payments
scheduled to repay the indebtedness.
15 U.S.C. § 1602(u) (1988).
43. Simplification Act § 612(a)(1) (amending Truth in Lending Act § 125, codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (1988)).
44. Simplification Act § 612(a)(4) (amending Truth in Lending Act § 125, codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1988)); see also S. REP. No. 368, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 29
(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 236, 265.
45. Simplification Act § 612(a)(3) (amending Truth in Lending Act § 125, codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1988)).
46. SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 292. The Simplification Act § 608(a)
(amending the Truth in Lending Act § 125, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1697 (1988)),
generally strengthened the power of enforcement agencies to force restitution to
1994] 639
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III. Limitations and Recoupment
A statute of limitation serves both private and public pur-
poses. 47 The direct effect is to insure repose for potential de-
fendants after lapse of time.48 It encourages prompt assertion
of claims to allow full and fair litigation of the issues while wit-
nesses are available, memories are fresher, documents can be
produced and final judgments can be rendered.49 Thus, the pri-
vate interests of potential defendants are served, while the pub-
lic interests are served as well by keeping stale litigation out of
the courts, barring inefficient use of limited public resources.50
Recoupment, on the other hand, is a common law doctrine
which allows the defensive use of a claim to reduce or defeat
plaintiff's claim if both claims arise from the same transac-
tion.51 Recoupment is generally considered timely as a defense,
although barred by limitation as an affirmative claim.5 2 It is
grounded in equity to prevent the defeat of otherwise valid de-
fenses, which in fairness will be considered despite the expira-
tion of the applicable limitation period, so long as plaintiff's
claim is before the court.53 Recoupment promotes efficient use
of judicial resources as well by avoiding circuity of action and
multiplicity of lawsuits, allowing simultaneous adjudication of
claims arising from the same transaction.54
consumers for truth in lending violations. Enforcement responsibility is assigned
to any of a number of agencies, depending upon the regulated entity. Enforcement
agencies include the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve
Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the National Credit Union
Administration. 15 U.S.C. § 1607(a) (1988). If enforcement is not otherwise dele-
gated, the Federal Trade Commission bears enforcement responsibility. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1607(c) (1988). The Simplification Act further provided that the right to rescind
shall extend to one year after the conclusion of an enforcement proceeding despite
the expiration of the three-year limitation period, unless the property had been
sold. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (1988).
47. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 18 (1970 & Supp. 1992).
48. Id. § 17.
49. Id. § 18, 19.
50. Id. § 19.
51. Id. § 77; see also Dworetzky, supra note 11, at 905, 907.
52. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 77 (1970 & Supp. 1992).
53. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 262 (1935). For a discussion of Bull,
see infra notes 65-70 and accompanying text. See also 20 AM. JUR. 2D Counter-
claim, Recoupment, and Setoff § 6 (1965).
54. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Counterclaim, Recoupment, and Setoff § 6 (1965).
640 [Vol. 14:633
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Courts have drawn a distinction between a true limitation
statute and a statute that specifically creates a right and simul-
taneously limits the time in which it may be asserted. 55 A true
limitation statute is thought to extinguish only the right to en-
force a remedy;56 a statute creating a time-limited right is
thought to extinguish the existence of the right itself upon the
passage of the applicable time period.57 Courts have used the
short-hand term "procedural" for the first type and "substan-
tive" for the second.58
Courts have almost uniformly allowed true recoupment
claims to survive general (procedural) statutes of limitation.59
These decisions conform with the underlying fairness of al-
lowing valid defenses to be raised to reduce or defeat a claim,
while not conflicting with the purpose of keeping stale litigation
out of court.60 Courts have split, however, when defendant's
claim is asserted under a statute creating the right and contain-
ing its (substantive) limitation as well. 61
Whether a limitation is procedural or substantive is a mat-
ter of statutory construction. 62 It is persuasive, but not conclu-
sive, that the limitation is contained in the same statute
creating the right.63 Thus, a statute that on its face is substan-
tive may still be given effect as if procedural, allowing for asser-
tion of the right under appropriate circumstances.64
Federal common law has adopted this view. An often cited
and leading case is Bull v. United States.65 The case arose when
the Internal Revenue Service adopted the position that a dece-
dent's partnership interest had been undervalued and was
therefore subject to estate tax, which the executor paid.66 After
55. 51 AM. JuR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 21 (1970 & Supp. 1992).
56. Id. § 15.
57. Id.
58. Id. § 21.
59. See 51 AM. JuR. 2D Limitation of Actions, supra note 52, § 77 and accom-
panying text.
60. See 51 AM. JuR. 2D Limitation ofActions, supra note 52, § 77.
61. Id. § 15.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Lincoln First Bank v. Rupert, 60 A.D.2d 193, 196-97, 400 N.Y.S.2d
618, 619 (4th Dep't 1977) (construing the Truth in Lending Act).
65. 295 U.S. 247 (1935).
66. Id. at 252.
1994] 641
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the time to claim a refund had passed, the I.R.S. then character-
ized the same amount as income and claimed a deficiency, de-
spite the fact that the amount could not be both income and
corpus. 67 The Bull court held that the income characterization
was correct, but the executor could nonetheless assert the re-
fund claim for estate taxes by recoupment:68 "This is because
recoupment is in the nature of a defense arising out of some
feature of the transaction upon which the plaintiff's action is
grounded. Such a defense is never barred by the statute of limi-
tations so long as the main action itself is timely."69
In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied on the unjust
enrichment that would otherwise accrue to the United States,
the executor's reliance on the initial I.R.S. position, the subse-
quent reversal of that position, and the power of the I.R.S. to
issue assessments with the force of judgments.70
Following the decision of the Bull Court, additional federal
litigation has reached similar results. In Pennsylvania Rail-
road v. Miller,71 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was con-
fronted with a suit to collect unpaid freight charges. 72 The bill
of lading covering the shipment provided that the carrier was
not liable for damage to the consigned goods if suit was not
brought within two years and one day after notice of a disal-
lowed claim for the loss. 73 Claims of loss were disallowed prior
to May 31, 1936, and the carrier filed suit for the unpaid portion
of the freight charges on June 10, 1938; 74 the defendant as-
serted the negligence of the carrier as a defense to the carrier's
claim.75 The court viewed this as a defense by way of recoup-
ment, holding that the provision in the bill of lading did not bar
the claim.76 The defendant sought no affirmative damages
"rather, he challenged the right of the carrier in equity and good
conscience to recover ... on the cause of action alleged."77 The
67. Id. at 252, 255.
68. Id. at 254, 262.
69. Id. at 262.
70. Id. at 258-60.
71. 124 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1941).
72. Id. at 161.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 161, 162.
77. Id. at 161-62.
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court explained that recoupment is not a set-off or counterclaim,
because it is not an affirmative demand, "but rather it lessens
or defeats any recovery by the plaintiff."7T The court summa-
rized its view of recoupment as follows:
Recoupment goes to the foundation of plaintiff's claim; it is avail-
able as a defense, although as an affirmative cause of action it
may be barred by limitation. The defense of recoupment, which
arises out of the same transaction as plaintiff's claim, survives as
long as the cause of action upon the claim exists. It is a doctrine
of an intrinsically defensive nature founded upon an equitable
reason, inhering in the same transaction, why the plaintiff's
claim in equity and good conscience should be reduced. 79
Thus, the Miller court upheld the recoupment defense in this
dispute revolving around the contractual limitation period.80
In United States v. Western Pacific Railroad,81 the Supreme
Court was confronted with construing a two-year statutory limi-
tation period in the Interstate Commerce Act, 82 which on its
face barred the government from asserting a claim in recoup-
ment against the railroad's affirmative action. This was a suit
by common carriers initiated in the Court of Claims to recover
from the United States, as shipper, the difference between the
amounts actually paid and the amounts allegedly due. 83 The
Court of Claims determined that the carrier's actions were sub-
ject to a six-year limitation period under the Tucker Act,84 while
the government's defense of unreasonableness was subject to a
two-year limitation period under the Interstate Commerce
Act.8 5
78. Id. at 162.
79. Id. (footnotes omitted).
80. Id.
81. 352 U.S. 59 (1956).
82. Id. at 70 (construing § 16(3)(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act, codified at
49 U.S.C. § 16(3) (1988)).
83. Id. at 60.
84. Id. at 70 (citing the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (1988) (providing that
every claim under the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is barred unless brought
within six years)).
85. Id. at 70-71. "Relying on the broad language of the... [Tucker] [Aict, the
Court of Claims has, since 1926, consistently held that § 16(3) [of the Interstate
Commerce Act) does not apply to suits by carriers to recover alleged undercharges
from the United States as shipper." Id. at 70.
1994] 643
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The Court reasoned that the purpose of statutes of limita-
tion "is to keep stale litigation out of the courts." 6 That purpose
was not implicated once the dispute was before the court:
To use the statute of limitations to cut off the consideration of a
particular defense.., is quite foreign to the policy of preventing
the commencement of stale litigation. We think it would be incon-
gruous to hold that once a lawsuit is properly before the court,
decision must be made without consideration of all the issues in
the case .... If this litigation is not stale, then no issue in it can
be deemed stale.8 7
The Court further stated that "[o]nly the clearest congressional
language could force us to a result which would allow a carrier
to recover unreasonable charges with impunity merely by wait-
ing two years before filing suit."88
In Burnett v. New York Central Railroad,8 9 the Supreme
Court was confronted with the assertion of an offensive claim by
the plaintiff beyond the statutory limitation period.90 An em-
ployee of the defendant railroad instituted an action in state
court under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), which
was dismissed for improper venue. 91 Eight days later suit was
filed in federal district court.92 Although the state action was
timely, during the eight days the applicable three-year limita-
tion period expired, and the district court dismissed the action
as untimely. 93 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the
limitation was "substantive" rather than "procedural," and
therefore was extinguished after three years.94
In holding that the statute of limitations had been tolled by
the state action, the Court began by stating that "whether,
under a given set of facts, a statute of limitations is to be tolled,
is one 'of legislative intent whether the right shall be enforcea-
86. Id. at 72.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 71.
89. 380 U.S. 424 (1965).
90. Id. at 425.
91. Id. at 424.
92. Id. at 425.
93. Id.
94. Id.
[Vol. 14:633644
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ble . . . after the prescribed time' 95. . . . Classification . . . as
'substantive' rather than 'procedural' does not determine
whether or under what circumstances the limitation period may
be extended."96
To determine congressional intent, the Court continued,
"the purposes and policies underlying the limitation provision,
the Act itself, and the remedial scheme developed for the en-
forcement of the rights given by the Act" must be examined. 97
Statutes of limitation, the Court reasoned, are designed to pro-
tect defendants from unfair surprise.98 "The theory is that even
if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on
notice to defend within the period of limitation . . .99
The policy to protect defendants, however, "is frequently
outweighed.., where the interests of justice require vindication
of plaintiff's rights."100 The Court then considered that the
action had been timely filed, that most states had statutes that
would permit transfer of the action or relation back to the initial
date of filing, and that the defendant had been properly served
under state law.1'0 Thus, the Court concluded that congres-
sional intent was to toll the statute under these
circumstances. 102
IV. Defensive Section 130 Claims and the
One-year Limitation
Because of the limited litigation on the defensive use of re-
scission, both courts in the rescission cases found precedential
value in decisions of courts considering defensive claims for sec-
tion 130 penalties under the Act after the applicable one-year
limitation period. 0 3 Congress, of course, settled the issue in
95. Id. at 426 (quoting Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 320
U.S. 356, 360 (1943)).
96. Id. at 426-27.
97. Id. at 427.
98. Id. at 428.
99. Id. (quoting Order of R.R. Tels. v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S.
342, 348-49 (1944)).
100. Id. at 428.
101. Id. at 431, 434, 435.
102. Id. at 432-35.
103. Dawe v. Merchants Mortgage & Trust, 683 P.2d 796 (Colo. 1984); FDIC
v. Ablin, 532 N.E.2d 379 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
1994] 645
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favor of the survival of the defensive civil penalty claim by
amendment in the Simplification Act. 04 A review of the cases
however, will add to the consideration of the survival of the
right to rescind by recoupment.
A. The Argument for Recoupment
A line of cases allowing recoupment based their holdings on
the underlying purposes of the Truth in Lending Act and a suffi-
ciently broad interpretation of federal common law recoupment
to allow, if not mandate, defensive claims after the one-year
limitation. An early and often-cited case is Wood Acceptance
Co. v. King.10 5
In Wood, the plaintiff sued on a deficiency judgment and
the defendant counterclaimed, asserting truth in lending viola-
tions and seeking civil penalties. 10 6 The court applied state law
to interpret the one-year limitation in the Act. 10 7 Under state
law, substantive limitations were to be interpreted in light of
the purposes of the law creating the limitation; 08 rote reliance
on substantive or procedural classifications was specifically re-
jected. 0 9 The court reasoned that the Truth in Lending Act was
meant to safeguard the consumer in the use of credit, and en-
forcement was placed largely in the hands of individual con-
sumers. 10 Thus, the Wood court found that the "one year
104. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
105. 309 N.E.2d 403 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
106. Id. at 404.
107. Id. at 405. The court relied on § 17 of the Illinois Limitations Act, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 83, para. 18 (1971), which provides: "A defendant may plead a set-off
or counter claim barred by the statute of limitation, while held and owned by him,
to any action, the cause of which was owned by the plaintiff... before such set-off
or counter claim was so barred. . . ." Wood, 309 N.E.2d at 404.
108. Wood, 309 N.E.2d at 405. The Wood court relied on Helle v. Brush, 292
N.E.2d 372 (Ill. 1973). The issue in Helle was whether defendant's counterclaim
arising out of the same occurrence, could be filed against a public entity despite
failure to give timely notice to the entity under applicable law. Id. at 373. The
Helle court found that the purposes of § 17 of the Limitations Act, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 83, para. 18 (1967), were a concern for fundamental fairness and a desire to
grant defendant a full hearing. These purposes outweighed the notice require-
ments under the applicable Illinois law, Local Government and Governmental Em-
ployees Tort Immunity Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, para. 8-102, 8-103 (1967).
Helle, 292 N.E.2d at 374-75.
109. Wood, 309 N.E.2d at 405.
110. Id.
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limitation.., is not such an integral part of the Federal Truth
in Lending Act as to outweigh the combined purposes of that
Act and the ... [Illinois] Limitations Act.""'
In Shannon v. Carter,112 the Supreme Court of Oregon sit-
ting en banc upheld the defensive assertion of a truth in lending
claim. Shannon was sued to recover the balance owing on a re-
tail installment contract to Associates Financial Services Co.,
the plaintiff below. 113 The Shannon court looked to federal law
in concluding that limitation periods could be extended by re-
coupment or otherwise, depending upon congressional intent.114
The court further reviewed common law recoupment, deciding
that the rationale underlying recoupment is to avoid ineq-
uity. 15 In upholding the defensive claim, the court reasoned
that the primary purpose of the civil liability section was one of
enforcement.116
In Household Consumer Discount Co. v. Vespaziani,117 the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania explicitly considered the issue
of whether federal or state common law governs, and whether a
defensive claim under section 130 of the Act is one in recoup-
ment or set-off. Defendant Vespaziani was sued on two notes
dated in 1972 that were in default; plaintiff's action was begun
in 1976.118 The defendant asserted violation of the Truth in
Lending Act defensively as a common law recoupment." 9
The court first concluded that federal common law governs,
because of concerns for uniformity and certainty in enforcing
federally created rights.120 In confronting the second issue, the
111. Id.
112. 579 P.2d 1288 (Or. 1978).
113. Id. at 1288-89.
114. Id. at 1289.
115. Id. at 1290.
116. Id.
117. 415 A.2d 689 (Pa. 1980); see infra text accompanying note 148 for the
distinction between recoupment and set-off.
118. Vespaziani, 415 A.2d at 690.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 691-93. The court reasoned that a state court must enforce federal
law or violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The court relied on the following cases. In Dice v. Akron,
Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952), at issue was the validity of a
written release from liability signed by the employee under the Federal Employer's
Liability Act (FELA). Vespaziani, 415 A.2d at 691. In reversing the decision be-
low, the Supreme Court reasoned that a federally created standard could be evis-
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court reasoned that both the action on the debt and the penal-
ties for the truth in lending violation arose from the same trans-
action. 121 Furthermore, the requirement to accurately disclose
the cost of the credit was at the very heart of the contract, and
was therefore an integral part of the transaction. 122 The court
concluded that the defensive claim was one in recoupment. 23 It
went on to hold that recoupment should be allowed beyond the
one-year limitation.124 Its holding was based on the superior po-
sition of the lender in the market, the consumer's inability to
determine proper compliance without legal assistance, which
normally is first obtained when the creditor forces legal action,
and the fear that a creditor could avoid penalties by delaying
suit until the limitation period had expired.125
The court in Vespaziani found support for its holding in
Plant v. Blazer Financial Services, Inc.,' 26 which held that a
creditor's counterclaim for amounts due on the underlying note
was mandatory when the consumer sued, seeking section 130
penalties for disclosure violations. 27 The facts are straightfor-
ward. Plant executed a note in July, 1975.128 Making no pay-
ments thereon, Plant brought an action in federal district court
in July, 1976, asserting failure of the creditor to make the re-
quired disclosures. 129 The district court allowed defendant's
counterclaim under state law on the note, despite no independ-
ent basis for federal court jurisdiction, ruling the counterclaim
cerated if interpretation was left to state law. Moreover, uniform application of
federal law was essential to achieve its purpose. In Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), the United States was denied recovery on a forged
check due to failure to comply with a notice requirement under Pennsylvania law.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the rights and duties of the United
States on commercial paper are governed by federal law, essential to uniform ap-
plication of the law. Vespaziani, 415 A.2d at 691-92. For an excellent discussion of
this issue, see Dworetzky, supra note 11, at 915 n.58 (concluding that federal com-
mon law governs claims under the Truth in Lending Act).
121. Vespaziani, 415 A.2d at 696.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 697.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 696.
126. 598 F.2d 1357 (5th Cir. 1979).
127. Id. at 1363.
128. Id. at 1359.
129. Id.
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was mandatory. 130 On appeal, Plant claimed the district court
erred, characterizing the counterclaim as permissive, and as-
serting dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 13 1
The Plant court adopted the "logical relationship" test
promulgated in Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co.,132 in which a counterclaim is considered compul-
sory if it arises from the same "aggregate of operative facts" as
the opponent's claim. 133 Applying this test, the court found the
conditions were met.134 The obvious factual overlap, a desire for
judicial economy, and a willingness to grant the defendant a
convenient forum for vindication of the defendant's claim man-
dated classification of the counterclaim as compulsory. 135
A decision that provides a well-reasoned summary of the
pro-recoupment line of cases is Beneficial Finance Co. v. Swag-
gerty.136 The defendant executed a promissory note in October,
1974.137 In July, 1976, after default on the note, the plaintiff
sued for the balance due. 138 Defendant counterclaimed, alleging
violations of the Truth in Lending Act and praying for section
130 penalties. 139 On motion for summary judgment, the trial
court dismissed the counterclaim as time-barred, reasoning
that the one-year limitation period was "substantive."140 The
appellate division affirmed, holding that recoupment was un-
130. Id. Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "Compul-
sory Counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at
the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against the opposing party, if it
arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the oppos-
ing party's claim .... " FED. R. Cirv. P. 13(a).
131. Plant, 598 F.2d at 1359-60.
132. 426 F.2d 709, 714 (5th Cir. 1970).
133. Plant, 598 F.2d at 1361 (quoting Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 426 F.2d 709, 715 (5th Cir. 1970)).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1363, 1364. In so holding, the Plant court rejected cases and com-
mentary to the contrary. These contrary holdings rest upon concern for affording
an efficient forum for vindication of the consumer-plaintiff's federally created
rights, recognizing the consumer's role as essential to proper enforcement of the
Truth in Lending Act. Id. at 1361-62.
136. 432 A.2d 512 (N.J. 1981). The case was consolidated with Consumers
Fin. Servs. v. Taylor. It is the facts of this second case that are discussed.
137. Id. at 514.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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available because the counterclaim did not arise from the same
transaction as the plaintiff's claim for default on the note.141
In reversing, the New Jersey Supreme Court applied fed-
eral common law to decide that the counterclaim was a claim in
recoupment and was not barred by the one-year limitation pe-
riod.142 Echoing previous decisions, the court began its analysis
of which law governs with the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution. 143 The court proceeded in its analysis to
Supreme Court doctrine enunciated in Burnett v. New York
Central Railroad'" and Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown
Railroad.145 Consistent with a policy of uniform interpretation
of federally created rights, the court concluded federal law
governs. 146
The court next considered whether the counterclaim was
one in recoupment, or conversely, a set-off.147 Recoupment, the
court recognized, is a counterclaim arising from the same trans-
action that is the basis of the plaintiff's claim and is used only
to reduce or defeat plaintiff's claim, whereas a set-off arises
from an independent transaction and may be awarded in any
amount. 148 The court concluded that the counterclaim was one
in recoupment. 49 "The underlying loan transaction... serves
as the common source for the correlative rights and liabilities of
lender and consumer."150 Furthermore, the court reasoned that
under both federal and New Jersey law, parties are deemed to
contract in light of existing law.151 The requirement for adher-
ence with the disclosure requirements of the Truth in Lending
Act is an implied term in the contract. 152 Therefore, the coun-
141. Id.at 514.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 515. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2.
144. Beneficial Fin. Co., 432 A.2d at 515; see supra notes 89-102 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of Burnett.
145. Beneficial Fin. Co., 432 A.2d at 515. For a synopsis of Dice, see supra
note 120.
146. Beneficial Fin. Co., 432 A-2d at 515.
147. Id. at 516.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 517.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 516.
152. Id. at 517.
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terclaim arises from the same transaction as plaintiff's claim,
and is one in recoupment. 153
Having determined that the counterclaim was a claim in
recoupment, the court considered next whether the one-year
limitation period barred such a claim. 54 The court rejected a
formalistic distinction between "substantive" and "procedural"
statutes of limitation. 155 "Origin of the right is not per se conclu-
sive whether the limitation of time 'extinguishes'. . . or 'merely
bars the remedy'. . . . Source is merely evidentiary, with other
factors of legislative intent whether the right shall be enforcea-
ble.., after the prescribed time .... "-156 The operative question
therefore "is whether congressional policy will be thwarted by
allowing the defense of recoupment."157
In analyzing congressional intent, the court recognized that
the purpose of the Truth in Lending Act is to promote the in-
formed use of credit. 158 It is remedial and is to be interpreted
liberally to effectuate legislative intent. 59 While the purpose of
the one-year limitation period is not clear, the court concluded
that allowing a claim in recoupment after one year was consis-
tent with legislative intent.160 Furthermore, the court was con-
cerned that to hold otherwise would allow the creditor to avoid
the penalties in the Act by delaying its suit beyond the one-year
limitation period. 161 Therefore, the court concluded that the
claim in recoupment is permissible beyond the one-year limit.162
B. The Argument Against Recoupment
Courts holding against recoupment claims have expressed
their reasoning in a variety of ways. The common thread in all
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. (quoting Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 320 U.S.
356, 360 (1943) (interpreting the Interstate Commerce Act)).
157. Id. at 518.
158. Id. at 519. "By requiring disclosure of credit terms and hidden costs, the
[Truth in Lending Act] cut a path to guide the consumer to an informed use of
credit." Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. For an earlier decision following the same line of reasoning, see Lin-
coln First Bank v. Rupert, 60 A.D.2d 193, 400 N.Y.S.2d 618 (4th Dep't 1977).
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these cases is the view that the truth in lending claim is extrin-
sic to the underlying transaction, and is therefore barred as an
impermissible set-off if not asserted within the one-year limita-
tion period.
In Hodges v. Community Loan & Investment Corp.,163 a
loan was granted to Hodges in June, 1972, the creditor initiated
suit on the note in September, 1973, and the borrower asserted
truth in lending violations, seeking section 130 penalties.164
The court began its analysis with the proposition that the truth
in lending violation for failure to properly disclose the terms of
credit occurs at the consummation of the loan transaction, and
is not a continuing violation.165 Therefore, the one-year period
starts to run at consummation of the loan. 166 The court rejected
the debtor's contention that the one-year limitation was inappli-
cable because the debtor was unaware of a possible truth in
lending violation until counsel was consulted after the creditor
brought suit.16 7 It did not feel bound by the holding in United
States v. Western Pacific Railroad,18 because the court con-
cluded the truth in lending claim was "not an integral part of
the action for money had and received; it is merely ancillary to
that action."169
On motion for rehearing, Hodges directly contended that
the counterclaim was in the nature of recoupment, and was
therefore not barred.170 In rejecting the motion, the court reit-
erated its view that the truth in lending claim was not an inte-
gral part of the loan transaction: "The ... counterclaim ... did
not arise out of the mutual obligations or covenants of the loan
163. 210 S.E.2d 826 (Ga. Ct. App.), reh'g denied, 210 S.E.2d 826 (1974).
164. Id. at 828.
165. Id. at 830 (relying on Wachtel v. West, 476 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973) (concerning an offensive claim for disclosure
violations)).
166. Hodges, 210 S.E.2d at 830.
167. Id. at 831.
168. 352 U.S. 59 (1956) (construing the combined effect of the Tucker Act and
the Interstate Commerce Act to allow the United States to assert a claim on which
the two-year limitation period had run defensively in recoupment against a claim
by the railroad which was subject to a six-year limitation period; both claims arose
out of the same transaction). For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 81-88
and accompanying text.
169. Hodges, 210 S.E.2d at 831.
170. Id. at 831.
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transaction.., but is independent thereof. Although the claim
arose contemporaneously with the execution of the contract, it
is not a product of a breach of any obligation or covenant
therein... -171 The court therefore concluded the counterclaim
was a set-off, not a recoupment, and denied the motion for
rehearing. 172
A case relying on Hodges is Aetna Finance Co. v. Pas-
quali.173 In this case, the creditor brought suit on a note exe-
cuted in April, 1976; the answer and truth in lending
counterclaim seeking section 130 penalties were filed June 28,
1977.174 It was conceded that the one-year limitation operated
to cut off an affirmative action, but the debtor advanced the
claim as one in recoupment. 175
The court began its analysis by acknowledging that the
purpose of the Truth in Lending Act is to require meaningful
disclosure by creditors, intended to promote informed credit
shopping by consumers. 176 Enforcement of the Act is carried out
through administrative action, criminal enforcement for willful
and knowing violation, and through the imposition of section
130 penalties in actions brought by aggrieved consumers. 177
Furthermore, both federal and state law allow an "affirmative
defense of equitable recoupment" to be advanced beyond the
limitation period. 178 "Therefore, if [the debtor's] defense and
counterclaim is in the nature of recoupment, it may be asserted
as long as [the creditor's] claim on the note survives." 179
In denying the debtor's claim, however, the court concluded
that the claim was not in the nature of recoupment. 80 To be in
the nature of recoupment, the court reasoned, the claim must
arise "out of some feature of the transaction upon which the
171. Id. at 832.
172. Id.; accord Hewlett v. John Blue Employees Fed. Credit Union, 344 So.
2d 505, 508 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976) (rejecting characterization of the counterclaim as
one in recoupment, citing Hodges for support that the truth in lending claim did
not arise from the mutual covenants of the parties).
173. 626 P.2d 1103 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
174. Id. at 1104.
175. Id. at 1105.
176. Id. at 1104.
177. Id. at 1104-05.
178. Id. at 1105.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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plaintiff's action is grounded,"181 and "[go] to the very existence
and foundation of plaintiff's claim."182 The court viewed the
truth in lending claim as not sufficiently enmeshed with the
mutual rights and duties contained in the contract between
debtor and creditor to satisfy these requirements. 183 "[Debtor's]
claim is predicated upon a specifically imposed statutory pen-
alty which is an extrinsic by-product of the loan transaction and
it is not dependent upon ... [the mutual] contractual obliga-
tions.... [It] does not go to the justness.., but is an affirmative
action . . . for an independent wrong." 18 4 Thus, at least when
the debtor claims no actual damages, the claim may not be as-
serted beyond the one-year limitation period. 185
V. The Rescission Cases
A. Dawe v. Merchants Mortgage & Trust
The primary case to consider survival of the right to rescind
beyond the limitation period is Dawe v. Merchants Mortgage &
Trust.8 6 The case involved a dispute that arose when the
Dawes purchased a lot in a subdivision under development, exe-
cuting a note and deed of trust on September 30, 1973.187 The
actual sales agreement was signed sometime between Septem-
ber 30 and October 4, 1973.188 It was undisputed that the notice
of right to rescind misidentified the expiration date of the
181. Id. (quoting Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 262 (1935)).
182. Id. at 1105 (citing Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S.
296 (1946)).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See Basham v. Finance Am. Corp., 583 F.2d 918 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1128 (1979). Basham raised the issue whether a debtor, having
filed a petition under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act, may respond to a claim
filed by a creditor by alleging a claim in recoupment for truth in lending violations
beyond the one-year limitation period. Id. at 927. The Basham court reasoned
that the Truth in Lending Act was designed "to provide protection to consumers by
affording them meaningful disclosure .... It was not designed, nor should it be
used to thwart, the valid claims of creditors." Id. at 928. In denying relief for the
debtors, it specifically limited its holding to the case when the debtor has suffered
no actual damage as a result of the truth in lending violation. Id. at 927-28 n.16.
"Certainly, however, such a claim [to the extent of actual damages] is much closer
to the concept of 'recouping' something unlawfully taken by the creditor." Id.
186. 683 P.2d 796 (Colo. 1984).
187. Id. at 798.
188. Id.
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right. 8 9 When it became apparent to the Dawes that the subdi-
vision improvements would not be completed, they suspended
regular payments as of August, 1974.190 Merchants, as assignee
of the seller, initiated action on the note in November, 1978.191
In June, 1980, over six years after the date of the transaction,
the Dawes notified Merchants that they were exercising their
right to rescind. 192 The trial court granted Merchants' motion
for summary judgment, which was affirmed by the Colorado
Court of Appeals. 193 The Supreme Court of Colorado, sitting en
banc, reversed. 194
The Supreme Court of Colorado reasoned that "[tihere is a
well recognized distinction between the maintenance of an orig-
inal action and the assertion of a defense by recoupment."195 It
is the defense of "[r]ecoupment, which arises out of and is con-
nected with the transaction upon which the original action is
brought, [which] survives for as long as the cause of action upon
the note exists." 196
The Dawe court found no direct precedent on point regard-
ing application of recoupment theory to rescission claims.197 It
reasoned by analogy without articulation to survival of claims
in recoupment for section 130 penalties under the Truth in
Lending Act.198 The court aligned itself with the series of cases
holding that section 130 penalties may be asserted in recoup-
ment to reduce creditors' claims, even though the recoupment
claims are asserted after the one-year limitation period. 199 The
court reasoned that the purpose of the Truth in Lending Act is
to assure meaningful disclosure to promote informed use of
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 798.
193. Id. The Court of Appeals rejected the Dawes' argument that rescission
could be raised defensively, holding that the right to recoup is predicated on the
existence of a contract, whereas rescission disaffirms the contract and is therefore
inconsistent with a recoupment theory. Merchants Mortgage & Trust v. Dawe, 660
P.2d 1299, 1301 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
194. Dawe, 683 P.2d at 801.
195. Id. at 799.
196. Id. (citing Wyatt v. Burnett, 36 P.2d 768, 769 (Colo. 1934)).
197. Id. at 800.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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credit.200 Furthermore, "[i]f recoupment claims were barred...
lenders could avoid the penalties of the [Truth in Lending] Act
by waiting, as here, three years or more to sue . . ."201 Thus,
the Dawe court concluded that to bar rescission as untimely
would frustrate the purposes of the Truth in Lending Act. 20 2
B. FDIC v. Ablin
The second case to consider the rescission remedy is FDIC
v. Ablin.20 3 In this case, the Ablins executed a note to a bank in
May, 1983, pledging their home as collateral.20 4 In February,
1986 the FDIC, as receiver, instituted a foreclosure action; in
February, 1987, the Ablins rescinded the loan on the basis that
they never received the required notice of right to rescind.205
Rescission was pled as a counterclaim and affirmative defense,
seeking return of all interest and other fees paid.20 6
The Ablin court, like the Dawe court, found no direct prece-
dent and again reasoned by analogy to civil penalties under the
Truth in Lending Act section 130.207 The Ablin court adopted
the rationale in Wood Acceptance Co. v. King,208 relying on the
combined effect of an Illinois statute of limitations 209 and the
purpose of the Truth in Lending Act "to safeguard the consumer
in... the utilization of credit and [because] enforcement is ac-
complished largely through . . . [private] civil actions."210 The
court made its decision expressly in light of the Simplification
Act amendment to the Truth in Lending Act section 130, specifi-
cally authorizing claims in recoupment or set-off beyond the
200. Id. at 800-01.
201. Id. at 801.
202. Id.
203. 532 N.E.2d 379 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
204. Id. at 379.
205. Id. at 379-80.
206. Id. The trial court granted summary judgment for the FDIC on the re-
scission claim, holding that the three-year limit barred both the counterclaim and
the defense. Id. at 380.
207. Id. at 381-82. For a discussion of the Truth in Lending Act § 130, see
supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
208. Ablin, 532 N.E.2d at 381. For a discussion of Wood Acceptance Co., see
supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
209. Ablin, 532 N.E.2d at 381; see supra note 107.
210. Ablin, 532 N.E.2d at 381.
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one-year limitation, except as otherwise provided by state
law.211
The Ablin court rejected the argument that Congress did
not intend survival of rescission claims in recoupment beyond
three years, because it had specifically authorized recoupment
or set-off for section 130 monetary penalties in the Simplifica-
tion Act, but had failed to provide a similar provision regarding
section 125 rescission rights.212 The Ablin court, relying on
Dawe, concluded that the right to rescind could be raised defen-
sively after the three-year limitation period had run.21 3
VI. Analysis
A. The Functioning of the Rescission Remedy
To illustrate the functioning of the remedy after an ex-
tended period of time, a simple example is offered:
A creditor grants a $100,000 loan with payment of interest-only
for fifteen years at the annual rate of 10%. After ten years of pay-
ments totalling $100,000 ($10,000 per year for ten years) the con-
sumer defaults and the creditor brings suit. No other fees were
paid by the consumer to the creditor. The consumer raises a
claim of rescission defensively to reduce the creditor's claim. If
rescission is allowed, the creditor's lien is automatically void and
the creditor must return all money paid by the consumer
($100,000). The consumer would then be required to return the
amount received from the creditor ($100,000). This would be net-
ted to zero and the consumer would be released from further
obligation.214
The essential effect of the remedy is to afford the consumer
an interest-free loan from the date of the transaction to the ex-
change of money after rescission. Therefore, the longer one al-
lows the right of rescission to be exercised, the greater the
benefit to the consumer, and the greater the penalty to the
creditor.
The writer estimates the following economic losses to the
creditor and corresponding economic gains to the consumer, as-
211. Id. For a brief discussion of the Simplification Act, see supra text accom-
panying note 40.
212. Ablin, 532 N.E.2d at 381-82.
213. Id. at 382.
214. 12 C.F.R. § 226.15(d) (1993).
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suming rescission is exercised immediately after each year, and
the consumer makes all required payments:215
YEAR LOSS ($)
1 9,090
3 24,869
5 37,908
10 61,446
Compare this to the fixed penalty amount under section 130 of
twice the finance charge not to exceed $1,000.216
The use of the rescission remedy after an extended period
of time effectively allows the knowledgeable consumer to bypass
the three-year limitation period. In the example, after ten
years the consumer can simply stop paying. In the normal case,
the creditor will sue, the debtor will rescind defensively, and the
debt will effectively have been canceled, with a real economic
loss to the creditor and gain to the debtor of $61,446.217
B. Analogy to Section 130 Penalties
1. Both courts in the principal cases reasoned by analogy
to the decisions considering recoupment claims
for section 130 penalties. 218
The pro-recoupment line of cases generally followed a line
of reasoning that began with recognition that federal law, as
opposed to state law, governs the question of whether to allow
215. The amounts computed represent the present value of the amounts re-
ceived by the creditor subtracted from the total payments called for in the loan
contract. This analysis assumes level interest rates, annual payments on the loan
at the end of each year, and ignores the effect of income taxes.
216. In theory, the $1,000 penalty, if assessed a significant amount of time
after consummation of the transaction, should be reduced to a lesser amount by a
present value calculation as well. If the $1,000 penalty were reduced to present
value at the loan contract rate of 10% per annum and income taxes are ignored,
the penalty is reduced to $909 after one year, $751 after three years, $621 after
five years, and $385 after ten years.
217. The intelligent creditor, of course, will consider not suing. The creditor
might wait until the consumer attempts to transfer title to the property, which is
likely to be held as extinguishing the right to rescind both offensively and defen-
sively. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f). Alternatively, the transfer may take place, and the
creditor could attempt to proceed in rem on its mortgage. Certainly, the Truth in
Lending Act did not envision this kind of cat-and-mouse game.
218. Dawe v. Merchants Mortgage & Trust, 683 P.2d 796 (Colo. 1984); FDIC
v. Ablin, 532 N.E.2d 379 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
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recoupment beyond the one-year statutory limit.219 This is
based on a concern for vindication of federally created rights
and for their uniform application. 220
Having decided that federal law governs, the courts then
surveyed the federal common law of recoupment. 221 The first
issue the courts had to consider was whether the section 130
counterclaim arose from the subject matter of plaintiff's
claim.222 The pro-recoupment courts found that the counter-
claim was an integral part of the loan transaction.223 The courts
reasoned that both the creditor's and debtor's claims arose si-
multaneously from consummation of the loan transaction, and
adjudication of both claims required inquiry into the same oper-
ative facts. 224 This contrasts with the anti-recoupment cases,
which viewed the counterclaim as unrelated to the mutual
rights and obligations contained in the loan contract, arising in-
stead from a separate statutory right.225
Either point of view regarding the common basis of the
claims can be supported in logic. 226 It cannot be denied, how-
ever, that there is a factual overlap and a clear nexus regarding
the foundations for both claims. It seems overly formalistic to
deny a debtor the ability to advance a claim because it arose
from a statutory obligation of the creditor, when the creditor is
suing on the very contract that gave rise to the statutory
obligation.
219. Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Swaggerty, 432 A.2d 512, 515 (N.J. 1981); House-
hold Consumer Discount Co. v. Vespaziani, 415 A.2d 689, 693 (Pa. 1980). For a
discussion of these and related cases, see supra part IV.A.
220. Vespaziani, 415 A.2d at 691-93; Plant v. Blazer Fin. Servs., Inc., 598 F.2d
1357 (5th Cir. 1979); see supra notes 117-31 and accompanying text. See generally,
supra part IV.A.
221. Beneficial Fin. Co., 432 A.2d at 515-16; Vespaziani, 415 A.2d at 693-96;
Shannon v. Carter, 579 P.2d 1288, 1290 (Or. 1978).
222. See, e.g., Vespaziani, 415 A.2d at 694; see supra notes 117-25 and accom-
panying text.
223. See, e.g., Vespaziani, 415 A.2d at 696; see supra part W.A.
224. Plant, 598 F.2d at 1363, 1364; see supra notes 126-35 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Plant.
225. Aetna Fin. Co. v. Pasquali, 626 P.2d 1103, 1105 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 173-85 and accompanying text.
Hodges v. Community Loan & Inv. Corp., 210 S.E.2d 826, 832 (Ga. Ct. App.), reh'g
denied, 210 S.E.2d 826 (1974). For a discussion of Hodges, see supra notes 163-72
and accompanying text.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 121-25, 147-53, 167-72.
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Neither can the issue be considered apart from the purpose
of the Truth in Lending Act. The statute is remedial, aimed at
promoting consistent, accurate information about the cost of
credit, to allow the consumer to make informed credit deci-
sions.227 The distinction between the precise terms of the loan
and the method of disclosure of those terms mandated by the
Act is, at least partially, artificial. The statutory penalties pay-
able to the consumer for violation of the Act arise from the very
wording and terms of the contract. Given the remedial purpose
of the Truth in Lending Act, artificial distinctions should not be
drawn to allow a creditor to exact compliance with its contract
when it has not disclosed its terms in accordance with the law.
The purpose of the law of recoupment is to do justice to the
parties in light of the transaction as a whole. 228 The pro-recoup-
ment courts, having found that the section 130 counterclaim
arises from the same transaction as plaintiff's claim, also found
that granting the section 130 penalties was at least consonant
with doing justice to the parties in light of the entire transac-
tion.229 These courts reflected on the remedial purpose of the
Truth in Lending Act, interpreting its provisions strictly to fos-
ter accurate disclosure of credit terms.230 Furthermore, private
legal action by the consumer was considered the primary en-
forcement mechanism; to frustrate consumer action is to frus-
trate enforcement of the Act.231
The pro-recoupment courts recognized that a consumer is
often unaware of the requirements of the Act, and of the con-
sumer's rights thereunder.232 As a practical matter, then, the
courts reasoned that violations will not become evident until
the consumer consults an attorney, often after the creditor has
instituted suit in the event of default.233 Under these condi-
227. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also Beneficial Fin. Co. v.
Swaggerty, 432 A.2d 517, 519 (N.J. 1981). For a discussion of Beneficial Fin. Co.,
see supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
228. Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 297, 299 (1946); see
generally supra notes 53, 65-70 and accompanying text.
229. Rothensies, 329 U.S. at 299; see generally supra part W.A.
230. Rothensies, 329 U.S. at 299; see generally supra part W.A.
231. Shannon v. Carter, 579 P.2d 1288, 1290 (Or. 1978); see supra notes 112-
16 and accompanying text for a discussion of Shannon.
232. See, e.g., Household Consumer Discount Co. v. Vespaziani, 415 A.2d 689,
696 (Pa. 1980); see supra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
233. See, e.g., Vespaziani, 415 A.2d at 696.
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tions, the courts were concerned that a creditor could avoid the
section 130 penalties by simply delaying action on the debt until
at least one year after consummation of the transaction.234 In
addition, at least one court took judicial notice of the superior
bargaining power of the creditor in a market dominated by in-
stitutional lenders. 235
2. Anti-Recoupment Analysis
The courts finding against recoupment viewed the situation
differently. These anti-recoupment courts saw no injustice in
disallowing the section 130 claims.236 There was no contention
that the truth in lending violation invalidated the debt,237 nor
did the debtor allege any actual harm resulting from the viola-
tion.238 According to these courts, the debtor simply was seek-
ing statutory penalties, without in any way diminishing the
justice of the creditor's claim for amounts properly due.239 The
time having expired for the debtor to seek the statutory penal-
ties, there was no reason to reduce the creditor's judgment on
the note. 240
In contrast, the pro-recoupment courts did not explicitly
consider the application of recoupment doctrine when no actual
harm to the defendant was alleged. The law of recoupment is
based on an equitable doctrine of fairness to do justice to the
parties as a whole.241 Without any harm, the purposes underly-
ing recoupment doctrine are not fully implicated. Instead, the
pro-recoupment courts analyzed the policies underlying the
Truth in Lending Act. It was in furtherance of these policies,
rather than a desire to do justice to the consumer in the trans-
action as a whole, that dominated their reasoning. 242 It is to
234. See, e.g., Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Swaggerty, 432 A.2d 512, 519 (N.J. 1981).
235. Vespaziani, 415 A.2d at 696.
236. See supra part IV.B.
237. Basham v. Finance America Corp., 583 F.2d 918, 927-28 (7th Cir. 1978);
see supra note 185 for a discussion of Basham.
238. Basham, 583 F.2d at 927.
239. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
241. Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 297, 299 (1946).
242. See supra notes 111, 116, 125, 155-62 and accompanying text. In none of
these cases did the consumer allege actual harm or detrimental reliance as a result
of the truth in lending violation.
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these policies, as modified by the Simplification Act, that the
analysis now turns.
C. The Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act
The Truth in Lending Act is an important consumer protec-
tion statute meant to be interpreted broadly on behalf of the
consumer.243 The Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform
Act, a package of comprehensive amendments, was enacted to
enhance the effectiveness of the Truth in Lending Act.2 "
In the Simplification Act, Congress turned its attention to
many of the factors the courts considered in dealing with sec-
tion 130 recoupment. Most directly, Congress authorized sec-
tion 130 recoupment claims beyond the one-year limitation.245
It did not do likewise in regard to rescission claims, however,
despite consideration and modification of the rescission rem-
edy.246 Furthermore, enforcement action was strengthened,
putting less emphasis on private action to achieve the purposes
of the Act.247 In connection with enforcement actions, the right
to rescind was extended to one year after the conclusion of ac-
tion by an enforcement agency if the three-year limitation pe-
riod had not expired prior to institution of the agency action.248
In allowing increased time to rescind in the case of agency en-
forcement action, it is evident Congress at least considered the
time limitation on the right to rescind. Congress did not, how-
ever, authorize defensive rescission claims, as it did for section
130 penalties.
The provisions of the Simplification Act mitigate the suita-
bility of analogy to the cases concluding that Congress intended
to allow claims for section 130 penalties in recoupment beyond
the one-year limitation period. Congress considered claims in
recoupment, but did not specifically authorize them for use in
rescission claims.249 Strengthened enforcement provisions and
243. See supra notes 10, 159 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
248. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
249. Given the sparsity of litigation of rescission claims asserted by recoup-
ment, it is of course possible that the issue was not on Congress' collective mind.
See supra notes 197, 207 and accompanying text regarding the limited litigation.
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an extension of the right to rescind in connection with enforce-
ment proceedings further diminish the force of the policy ration-
ale expressed by the section 130 pro-recoupment cases, and
therefore weaken the effectiveness of analogy to them.250
D. The Rescission Remedy and Recoupment
The rescission remedy is different in kind than the section
130 monetary penalties. It is a benign sounding remedy, in-
tended to put the parties in status quo ante; and so it does, if it
is exercised within a reasonable time after consummation of the
loan. The exchange of property mandated by the rescission pro-
cedure ignores the time-value of money. As reflected in the ex-
ample and related analysis above, the economic loss to the
creditor, and corresponding gain to the debtor grows over time,
to a significant amount of the principal value of the loan.251
This is in stark comparison to the section 130 penalties,
which are limited to twice the finance charge, not to exceed
$1,000.252 As a typical loan transaction often has a finance
charge in excess of $500, the maximum penalty is capped, often
at a very modest amount in relation to the loan proceeds. Fur-
thermore, in the case of the section 130 penalties, the adverse
economic impact on the creditor decreases over time, because of
the same time-value of money that causes the impact of the re-
250. If the foregoing attenuates the policy rationale for allowing defensive re-
coupment claims, other considerations by Congress add vitality to the rationale.
Congress was aware that many claims for truth in lending violations were being
advanced on highly technical grounds. See supra notes 33, 34 and accompanying
text. In an attempt to give meaning to the term "simplification" in the Simplifica-
tion and Reform Act, Congress limited creditor liability to errors of central impor-
tance only. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. Disclosure violations that
extend the right to rescind beyond the statutory three-day period were limited to
errors in material disclosures only, while Congress left intact extension of the right
to rescind for any error in the required notice of the right itself. See supra note 36
and accompanying text. In regard to errors in material disclosure that extend the
right to rescind, there is, therefore, a stronger argument to construe the right more
strictly against the creditor after consideration of the effect of the Simplification
Act. Although research has revealed no affirmative consideration of errors in the
notice itself that extend the right to rescind, there is at least an inference that
Congress considered strict compliance to be of central importance as well. Viola-
tions in the notice procedure should therefore be strictly interpreted against the
creditor.
251. See supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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scission remedy to increase over time. This effect makes anal-
ogy to section 130 penalties inapposite.
The Truth in Lending Act is not intended to undermine
the otherwise valid claims of creditors. 253 Extension of the re-
scission remedy beyond the three-year limit does that to a sig-
nificant degree, however. Without clear indication of
Congressional intent to allow recoupment, courts should not
categorically permit it. The requisite intent is not evident.
When Congress could have directly settled the issue by legisla-
tion in the Simplification Act, it did not, despite its considera-
tion of recoupment and of rescission.254
It is not necessary to categorically allow or disallow rescis-
sion claims in recoupment. One reason courts have allowed re-
coupment for section 130 penalties is a belief that the creditor
could otherwise avoid the Act by delaying its action on the note
until after one year had passed. 255 In such a case, the courts
could allow recoupment on a theory of equitable tolling,256 con-
sonant with the underlying purposes of the Truth in Lending
Act. The same is true if there had been actual damages or detri-
mental reliance on either disclosure violations, improper notice
of the right to cancel, or, perhaps most significantly, no notice at
all.25 7 Without actual harm, the policies of fairness and justice
underlying recoupment doctrine are not fully called into play.
Absent one of these factors, claims for rescission in recoupment
beyond the three-year limitation period should be disallowed as
not in accordance with congressional intent.
VII. Conclusion
The issue of recoupment and the right to rescind is one of
statutory interpretation. Congress provided a three year limit
in which to exercise the right and, despite specifically authoriz-
ing recoupment for section 130 penalties, it has not done so for
rescission. The rescission remedy is different in kind than sec-
tion 130 penalties, as the economic impact of the remedy in-
253. See supra note 185.
254. See supra part VI.C.
255. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
256. See, e.g., Burnett v. New York Central R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1965). For a
discussion of Burnett, see supra notes 89-102 and accompanying text.
257. Burnett, 380 U.S. at 424.
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creases over time. Without evidence of clear congressional
intent, the courts should not categorically allow rescission
claims in recoupment. Under appropriate circumstances, such
as intentional delay, actual harm, or detrimental reliance,
claims for rescission in recoupment may be allowed.
Daniel Rothstein
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